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Defense Win! Missing one pre-trial TPR hearing not sufficient basis for default judgment

  • Ehren Hasz
  • Jun 13, 2023
  • 3 min read

Kenosha County Division of Child and Family Services v. D.R.-R., 2022AP1812, 06/01/23, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In what should not be a shocking outcome, a mother's failure to appear at a single pre-trial hearing is not "egregious" and does not support a default judgment on grounds.

On Point has covered recent decisions from the Districts 1, 3, and 4, which have affirmed default judgment orders entered after a parent failed to appear at a single hearing. See State v. M.R.K., Price County v. T.L., and Dane County v. A.D.  In this case, District 2 applies the appropriate definition of egregious in the context of a missed TPR hearing. Unlike the cases cited above, the court here reaffirms that the entry of a default judgment is a "particularly harsh sanction" and that an act is "egregious" if it is "extraordinary in some bad way; glaring, flagrant." Further, egregious conduct "means a conscious attempt to affect the outcome of litigation or a flagrant, knowing disregard of the judicial process." Finally, the court notes that unintentional conduct may be egregious only if it is "so extreme, substantial, and persistent." (Opinion,¶¶24-25).

That being said, the facts and record set out in the opinion stand out as truly compelling. D.R.-R. was born in Guatemala, stopped attending school in the first grade, and utilized a K'iche' interpreter for all proceedings in this her TPR case and the underlying CHIPS case. (Op., ¶¶2-5). In 2019, a CHIPS order was entered placing D.R.-R.'s daughter outside of the home. During the CHIPS case, D.R.-R. attended more than a dozen in-person hearings. In March 2021, the county petitioned to terminate her parental rights. Despite clear communication issues between D.R.-R., her trial counsel, the interpreter, and the court, D.R.-R. appeared at the first four TPR hearings and the case was set for trial. Yet, immediately after D.R.-R. failed to appear for a scheduled "jury status" hearing, the county immediately moved for a default judgment on grounds. (Op.,¶¶13-14). The circuit court granted the order based on the fact that the court had "given default warnings" at the three prior TPR hearings.

D.R.-R. opposed the default order, later sought to vacate it, filed a postdisposition motion, which was denied, and then appealed. In a welcome framing of the issue on appeal, the court focuses on the county's arguments in support of the "default sanction." (Op.,¶20). First, the county relied on Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5), which states that a default judgment may be rendered against a party who fails to appear at trial. The court quickly rejects this argument because the provision applies "at trial" and the hearing D.R.-R. missed was a jury status hearing. (Op.,¶22).

Next, the county relied on Wis. Stat. § 805.03, which authorizes grants circuit courts the authority to sanction a party for failure to comply with a court order. The court notes, however, that sanctions imposed under § 805.03 must be "just," and a default judgment is a "particularly harsh sanction" that is "just" only if the non-complying party's conduct has been egregious or in bad faith. (Op.,¶24) (citing Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28). From there, the outcome seems obvious: D.R.-R.'s single missed jury status hearing "was not egregious." (Op.,¶¶26-39). The court concludes by noting that the county "has not identified any case in which the circuit court determined a parent's conduct was egregious and granted default on such a meager record." (Op.,¶39).

While D.R.-R.'s case presents extremely compelling reasons to reverse, the application of the legal reasoning set forth in this case would seem to apply to any and every case where a parent simply fails to appear at a pre-trial hearing. While the case is not eligible for publication, it is a must cite, as persuasive authority, in any motion to vacate a default judgment order or on appeal from a TPR order premised on a default judgment order that is not supported by a parent's supposedly egregious conduct. If you're looking for a thorough and meaningful definition of "egregious" in this context, look no further. (Op.,¶25).

 
 
 

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On Point is sponsored by the Wisconsin State Public Defender. All content is subject to public disclosure. Comments are moderated. If you have questions about this blog, please email on.point@opd.wi.gov.

On Point provides information (not legal advice) about important developments in the law. Please note that this information may not be up to date. Viewing this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship with the Wisconsin State Public Defender. Readers should consult an attorney for their legal needs.

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